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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000160

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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,  
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>  
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC  
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS)  
NSC FOR SMITH  
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#)  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MEXICAN DELEGATION ON CHEMICAL  
WEAPONS ISSUES

Classified By: Permanent Representative Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.5  
(B) and (D).

This is CWC-09-08.

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action message, see para 13

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)2. (C) On February 13, Ambassador Javits and the del  
met with Mexican Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco and  
delegates Miguel Zamudio and Blanca Hernandez Polo.  
Intended as a venue to share thoughts on the upcoming  
Review Conference, the discussion covered  
preparations for the RevCon in some detail on both  
process and substance, as well as views on the  
dynamics of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the  
OPCW. Amb. Lomonaco also shared his understanding of  
the status of Mexico's implementing legislation in  
Parliament.

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THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND "POLARIZATION"  
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[1](#)3. (C) Amb. Lomonaco acknowledged that polarization  
of positions along north-south lines is a problem,  
and particularly unhelpful in the context of RevCon  
preparations. He said that Mexico has been  
participating in NAM meetings as an observer, and as  
such has useful insight into the group's  
deliberations. He added that the Mexican role within  
GRULAC is complicated by what many perceive to be a  
tendency on the part of Mexico toward more "North  
American" views since NAFTA.

[1](#)4. (C) Amb. Lomonaco characterized the view within  
NAM as "us versus them." He noted that the "WEOG  
Plus" tends to appear "monolithic"; he specifically  
noted that the "Europeans" all raise their flags and  
echo each other on the floor. Amb. Lomonaco  
portrayed the NAM as less monolithic, saying its

strategy is to capture a number of voices with one clear statement, followed by States Parties (SPs) raising their own issues individually. In response to Del objections to the NAM's role in the OPCW given its lack of any official status, Zamudio noted that a public debate in this vein was not constructive. He underlined the importance of working together to achieve RevCon objectives.

15. (C) Amb. Lomonaco went on to cite the specific case of the RevCon Provisional Agenda and the handling of the draft text as good examples of attempts to express valid concern that quickly devolved into debates between the NAM and WEOG Plus. Regarding the Provisional Agenda, the process has exacerbated the polarization of positions and has encouraged the NAM to entrench. On the draft report text, he noted the concern that the Chair's incorporation of comments is something of a "black box" and is not transparent enough on how choices are made for inclusion/exclusion of input. This has given rise to suspicion among NAM members that suggestions from certain SPs (Western states) are given preferential treatment.

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PROPOSED REVCON DRAFTING GROUP  
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16. (C) Amb. Javits noted the useful contributions made by Amb. Lomonaco during RevCon OEWG meetings and raised the idea of his chairing a drafting committee to address these concerns. Amb. Lomonaco was adamant that he lacked the capacity to take on that role, but

he agreed that the process needs to be opened up -- specifically to include Iran so that they will not be able to drag things out later. Both ambassadors agreed that a "friends of the Chair" group would be a good mechanism to vet proposed changes in the RevCon texts without undermining the Chair's position. Delrep noted that this would be a good time to propose such a group since the first draft is complete and the political declaration will be next on the working group's agenda. All agreed that two representatives from each official regional group would ensure adequate political and geographical diversity, avoiding direct NAM (and EU) representatives. Amb. Javits and Amb. Lomonaco agreed to each raise the idea individually with the UK Chair.

17. (C) Amb. Javits phoned UK Amb. Parker following this meeting to discuss the idea of a "friends of the chair" group. Parker saw the advantage of creating such a group and said he would think about the timing for establishing it.

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REVCON WORKING GROUP SUBSTANCE  
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18. (C) On the substance of progress to date in the Open Ended Working Group, Amb. Lomonaco noted that Mexico had no concerns with the agenda items on terrorism and the relationship between the OPCW and other international organizations. On the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), Mexico is concerned that the Board's draft recommendations not be selectively quoted in the Chair's text, and Amb. Lomonaco thought perhaps his delegation could support the Japanese suggestion to have a consolidated reference to the report of the SAB. Del shared current thinking in Washington on improving the process by which the SAB pursues topics of interest and provides recommendations to the Director General. Zamudio noted that the SAB is a "divisive element" for many NAM delegations, who see it as a means to justify and

reinforce issues that are of greatest concern to industrialized SPs.

¶9. (C) Discussions turned to Article XI, and Amb. Lomonaco suggested opening up discussion to "see what's behind the rhetoric" on both sides. His delegation later added that, with the number of working groups established to make progress in other areas, it hardly seemed fair that a Plan of Action could not be established. Amb. Javits noted that it was difficult to agree to such a plan when the desired objectives had yet to be articulated. He suggested focusing more in the future on "cross-fertilization" between industries, and that the U.S. might be able to put forward a proposal to re-start the dialogue on assistance (exchanges, internships, etc.). Amb. Lomonaco agreed that, if a developed country put forward a concept paper on Article XI assistance, it could be seen as a good faith gesture that the developed countries were willing to engage constructively on this important topic.

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MEXICAN IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION  
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¶10. (C) Amb. Lomonaco provided an update as to the status of its national implementing legislation. The current draft legislation has moved quickly; however, full passage has been held up over concerns by Mexico's chemical industry -- which generally is supportive of CWC provisions on industry verification -- on two points. First, the draft legislation includes a list of chemicals more extensive than

those in the CWC's schedules. Second, the draft legislation proposes establishing exclusive customs points for importing and exporting certain chemical substances. Mexico's industry opposes both these provisions. Amb. Lomonaco inquired specifically as to whether the U.S. had influenced these specific aspects of the legislation.

¶11. (C) The Mexican delegation was quite frank about the linkage and parallels in deadlines for destruction and national implementation, and made it clear that Mexico's instructions continue to include vocal criticism of delays in U.S. CW destruction. Amb. Lomonaco explained the perception of many in the NAM that the DG's RevCon paper can be interpreted as an implicit admission that the final deadline will not be met, which is not healthy for the Organization. Another widely-held perception is that the DG's paper is not well-balanced and essentially lets the U.S. off too easily on destruction while taking a harder line on small states in meeting deadlines for national implementation and other areas of the Convention. When the importance of considering specific circumstances was discussed, the Mexicans clearly drew a parallel between the deadlines for U.S. destruction and Mexico's (and others') progress on national implementation.

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COMMENT  
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¶12. (C) Amb. Lomonaco's portrayal of the "WEOG Plus" and the NAM counters commonly-held WEOG views that the WEOG is neither effectively coordinated nor vocal enough. The Mexican delegation's perspective is useful in better understanding the NAM and how to engage them as the battle lines are drawn in preparation for the RevCon.

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ACTION REQUEST  
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¶13. (C): Del would appreciate further information on whether the USG (DHS or another agency) has pushed for the establishment of separate customs points in Mexico, and whether we can respond to Amb. Lomonaco's question (ref Para 10).

¶12. (U) Javits sends.  
Arnall